



I n Syria — as in neighbouring Middle-Easterncountries — access to water is a daunting problem.
The World Bank classifies the Middle East and
Northern Africa (MENA) region as one of the driest
areas of the world. With a current region-wide
availability of water estimated at 1200 cubic meters
per capita per year, this group of countries hovers
only marginally above the Bank’s benchmark of
1,000 cubic meters of available water per capita per
year — a cut-off point below which countries are
considered to have a serious water shortage.
By this definition, Syria — one of the most severely
parched countries within the MENA group — can
already be considered to be in crisis: its current
water availability is calculated at 432 cu m/capita/year,
far below the World Bank’s demarcation point for
water scarcity. And the situation appears destined
to deteriorate further. Pressure from a young and
growing population and the demands of an
economically crucial agricultural sector are
expected to lower Syria’s available water to a
mere 160 cubic meters by 2025.
Given the pressures that are already being felt,
Syrian farmers have been implementing several
adaptive measures that, in the long run, may make
matters worse. For example, the digging of new
wells — most of them illegal — has contributed to a
decline in ground water levels, as wells are
pumped faster than they can be renewed. Farmers
are also increasingly using brackish water to irrigate
their crops, a practice that is likely to increase the
salinity of the soil and in turn lower agricultural
productivity.
Farmers’ survival tactics
Higher salt levels in soil are normal in the arid
climatic conditions typical of Syria’s deserts and
steppes. Crystalized salts are left at the soil surface
— at the interface between the land and air — as
water is drawn upward through the soil and
evaporates into the atmosphere. In the past this
has not posed serious problems: under the
traditional Syrian system of crop rotation, which
leaves the land fallow for extended periods, levels
of salt in topsoil have remained relatively low.
Recent changes in agricultural practices, however,
have altered the picture. Intensive agriculture
involving more frequent crop rotations has
increased the volumes of water moving through
the soil, thereby boosting its salinity. The salt
content of soil and groundwater have also been
increased by the growing practice of “flood
irrigation,” whereby large volumes of water are
pumped onto fields, creating standing pools that
eventually percolate down through the soil. This
has resulted in more salt finding its way into
underground reservoirs and wells. In turn, the
increasing salinity of groundwater, which is used
for irrigation, has become a key contributor to
elevated salt levels in the soil.
The implications of this trend are profound and
disturbing. Syria sees a robust agricultural sector
as central to its plans both for food security and
for future economic growth. Those plans would fall
apart, however, if increased soil salinity led to
decreased productivity of agricultural lands.
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Searching for an interim irrigation solution
Researchers in Syria investigate whether — under some conditions —
brackish water can be used for irrigation without damaging soil
Economically dependent upon agriculture and facing a deepening water crisis, Syria
needs to find ways to make its limited water go further. As farmers turn to irrigating
with saline water, IDRC-supported researchers proposed that perhaps they should be
allowed to continue — if guidelines for using brackish water can be established. But
who are most likely to pay attention to the researchers’ findings: government officials,
farmers, or regional agencies?
Yet at the same time, it would be unrealistic to
expect farmers to simply stop irrigating with
brackish water. For some, it is the only type of
water they have. It is estimated, for example, that
over 70 percent of Syrian farmers use flood
irrigation and that many continue to do so after
their wells have become saline.
Given that these practices are so firmly established,
the Brackish Water Project set out to investigate if
there were circumstances under which saline water
could be safely used for irrigation. The group
hoped to establish parameters that would instruct
farmers and government on how to use brackish
water without threatening the environment or
significantly diminishing the productivity of the
soil (and, by extension, farmers’ livelihoods). In
doing so, they would formulate a “bridge” strategy
where current practices could be continued, in a
modified form, until more permanent solutions to
MENA’s water crisis are found. Such a strategy
would be of interest not just in Syria but across
the region.
Water, public policy, and IDRC
For IDRC, supporting the Brackish Water Project
was a natural fit, because the project’s goals
intersected with at least two of the Centre’s
ongoing thematic interests.
First, IDRC has a history of supporting research on
water that focuses on small-scale, decentralized,
local-level solutions. IDRC’s small-scale orientation
meshed with the approach of researchers from the
International Centre for Agriculture of Research in
Dry Areas (ICARDA), Syria’s University of Aleppo
and Canada’s McGill University, who undertook
the research. The Syrian government had also
expressed its interest in small-scale, demand-side
approaches to water through its promotion of
efficient sprinkler and drip-irrigation technologies.
Another long-term interest for IDRC is the question
of how research can inform and influence
government policy. On this front, however, it
became increasingly clear that the project’s
potential was constrained by the nature of the
Syrian political system, and by a policy formation
process that some of the foreign researchers
connected with the project described as “opaque”
and difficult to understand.
In the best of circumstances, policy-oriented
research can stimulate vigorous public debate,
allowing for different options to be aired with, it
is hoped, the best choices filtering upward to the
attention of the bureaucrats and politicians who
set the national agenda.
But this is unlikely to happen under a political
system such as Syria’s. As Bryon Gillespie, who
evaluated the policy influence of the project for
IDRC, states, “policy decisions are made at the top,
and are not offered for public scrutiny.” Any
opportunity to influence how top officials make
their decisions come through the apparatus of the
ruling Ba’th party, rather than through the country’s
six-party, 250 member elected legislature (which is
generally taken to operate as a ‘rubber stamp’) or
civil society organizations.
Since the current regime came into power in 1970,
Syrian agricultural policy has reflected the
country’s Soviet-inspired, centrally managed
economic model. Recently, however, President
Bashar Al Asad (who assumed power in 2000)
has instituted limited economic reforms. The
bureaucracy’s role has changed from simply
commanding that quotas be met, to providing
farmers with technical advice and offering financial
incentives (for example, by having marketing
agencies buy strategically important crops at
preferential prices).
What kind of research role?
Despite such cautious steps toward liberalization,
policy formation in Syria remains largely insulated
from outside input. This appears to have limited
the scope of the Brackish Water Project. Gillespie
observed, for example, that, “I saw no social
research, nor any research which looked into
agricultural policies.”
More broadly, the role and value of research
within the Syrian system remains an open
question. Gillespie noted, for example, that several
experts he had spoken to remarked that “in Syria
it is frequently the case that the technical reports
[produced by the government’s own research
agencies] get shelved and go unread at higher
levels.”
Others, however, say that research can be effective
when it is targeted to questions that officials are
actively considering. While researchers will
generally not be invited to contribute to the actual
formation of policy, they are sometimes enlisted in
a supportive role, providing technical advice on
what means will be most effective in achieving
already-formulated goals.
“Influencing the policy comes as you find
technologies or recommendations that respond to
the needs of the decision-makers at the time when
they want to formulate policies,” says Dr Theib
Oweis, Senior Water Specialist with ICARDA.
Oweis suggests that donors sometimes place too
much emphasis on the direct impact of research
on policy formulation. “Not everything requires
policy changes,” he says, “although we know that
policies are instrumental in making changes.”
Researchers also have to make sure that even the
terminology they use aligns with the government’s
broader political objectives. For instance, the
phrase “water demand management” — commonly
used by IDRC-sponsored researchers — is
problematic in Syria. The government believes it
shifts focus towards domestic consumption and
away from issues of international access to water.
The phrase is therefore seen as undermining
Syria’s case for access to water that has brought it
into competition with Turkey, Iraq and other
neighbours.
Practical and political influence
Despite the apparent impenetrability of Syria’s
policymaking process, there was one occasion
where the Brackish Water Project’s research did
appear to have a direct influence on policy.
Research examining the variables that affect the
impact of saline water on soil indicated that salt
accumulation is most severe in heavier clay soils.
After these findings were presented at a conference
where Ministry of Irrigation officials were present,
a decree was issued forbidding farmers to irrigate
high clay content fields with drainage water, which
is likely to have high levels of salt.
Other than that, the project’s influence has so far
been felt outside the sphere of formal policy-
making. Researchers reported, for instance, that
after the findings of a master’s thesis funded by
the project — which showed, among other things,
that the sham 6 variety of wheat is most resistant
to the effects of salt — the demand for sham 6 on
the black market increased in the area where the
experiments took place. This indicates that the
research helped change farmers’ outlook and
influenced their practices.
Gillespie suggests, however, that the most
significant impacts of the project fall under the
rubrics of “expanding policy capacities” and
“broadening policy horizons.” For example, several
young Syrian researchers, whose research and
graduate studies were supported by the project, are
now employed by the ministries of agriculture and
irrigation. Bringing their knowledge and experience
to their current positions, their presence indicates
an effective expansion of research capacity within
Syrian institutions. It also promises to bring new
perspectives into the culture of the Syrian research
community. For example, the researchers’
experience of conducting experiments in farmers’
fields—rather than at isolated research stations —
was new in Syria.
Some signs of change?
A similar expansion of capacity took place when
one of the senior participants in the project was
appointed — co-incidentally, rather than as a direct
result of the project’s work — to the position of
Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform. In
his new role as minister, Dr Noureddin Mona
instituted a series of reforms intended to elevate
the stature of research within the ministry. While
Mona was minister only for a short time, it is
possible that the ascent of members of the
research community into decision-making roles
may lead to a new reality where research becomes
a stronger contributor to policy formulation.
Gillespie considers that the most important impact
of the Brackish Water Project to have occurred on
the regional stage. The creation of the International
Centre for Biosaline Agriculture (ICBA),
headquartered in Dubai, speaks volumes about the
growing currency of the idea that standards can be
established for the safe use of brackish water — an
idea that was not part of the debate on the
Mideast water shortage before the project first
held it up to scrutiny.
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 Political context can limit the scope and types of research that are possible.
 Research can have an impact even if it doesn’t change policy. In this case, for example, farmers
acted on research results.
 Expansion of domestic research capacity and shifts in understanding at the international level are
longer term forms of policy influence.
Key lessons
The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) is a Canadian public corporation, created to help
developing countries find solutions to the social, economic, and natural resource problems they face. Support is
directed to building an indigenous research capacity. Because influencing the policy process is an important
aspect of IDRC’s work, in 2001 the Evaluation Unit launched a strategic evaluation of more than 60 projects in
some 20 countries to examine whether and how the research it supports influences public policy and decision-
making.The evaluation design and studies can be found at: www.idrc.ca/evaluation_policy
